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The emergence of poverty as a social issue has exposed the parochialism
of legal education and the emphasis in law school training on the interests of
the holders of private wealth. There has been a resulting demand for the
incorporation of the issues embraced by "law and poverty" into the curriculum.
But how is this to be achieved? How are these issues to be related to the
existing curriculum? Which definitions of poverty, which views of the roots
of poverty, and which prescriptions for the necessary changes are to be pre-
sented?
The significance of this first, formal, bound, West-published treatment of
poverty for study in the law school is in the manner in which it answers these
questions. The issues of "law and poverty" are sufficiently far-ranging and
resonant, with implications in most subject matter areas, to provide the law
school an opportunity to transcend its trade-school origins. Accordingly, it
is appropriate to consider the book as a response to the challenges and criti-
cisms of legal education which arise from the recognition of poverty, to situate
the book within this basically political controversy, and to point up the implica-
tions of the contents and organization of the book for the development of
legal education.
The book is organized into five chapters, entitled respectively "Income
Maintenance" (Welfare), "Racial Discrimination in Employment," "Housing,"
"Consumer Credit," and "Selected Problems in Family Law and Poverty."
Each of these sections contains edited judicial opinions, editors' notes, statutory
material, excerpts from books and articles, and other secondary material of the
kind customarily found in law school casebooks currently in use. Each of the
individual chapters may be obtained in separate pamphlets for incorporation as
supplementary materials into existing law school courses. When so employed,
the materials could, in the hands of an imaginative and capable teacher, sig-
nificantly enhance those courses, despite the absence of guidelines by the
editors for the integration of the materials into the traditional courses. Un-
fortunately, the book is more likely to be used in its entirety to make possible
the offering of a special "poverty law" course as one more elective to be added
to the multitude of traditional courses already offered in the law schools.
The focus of Law and Poverty is on the assertion of "legal rights" by
the poor within the five subject matter areas. To a lesser extent, ameliorative
schemes are presented. But the approach taken fails to confront in what we
would consider a significant manner the political and economic reality of the
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factors underlying poverty-the undue inequalities in the distribution of in-
come, resources, and social honor. Nor does it adequately come to grips with
the impact of economic and political choices implicit in governmental decisions
affecting the distribution of wealth.
There is thus the danger that the book will be used as a means of pro-
viding an overly facile response to the demands of students for "relevance" in
their educational experience rather than as a tool for introducing a genuinely
constructive first (albeit small) step toward revamping the entire law school
curriculum in response to the desperate need of our society to cope with those
causes and conditions of poverty which are amenable to treatment through
judicial, legislative, and administrative processes. Law and Poverty is a case-
book of the traditional variety ("Cases and Materials") which pulls together
edited judicial opinions and secondary materials whose common thread is that
the particular problems or controversies involved in them concern poor people,
although the legal issues may not be peculiar to the poor, or may be of less
importance to the poor than other issues which are omitted from the book,
and all of which ought to be included in existing law school courses rather
than in a separate "poverty law" course.
The editors have done a thorough and intelligent job of assembling and
editing the casebook. They have provided for the student and practicing
lawyer a large amount of interesting and useful material, most of which is not
available in any other source book. However, in our view, what really matters
about the book, representing as it does the first formal treatment in the law
school curriculum of the problem of poverty, is not the style of editing, the
occasional omission or questionable inclusion, but the book's approach to and
conception of the problem. And it is here that the reviewers find themselves
in fundamental disagreement with what appears to be the viewpoint of the
editors of Law and Poverty.
The creation of a separate law school course in "poverty law" implies that
a special course is required to deal with the legal problems of the poor, that
the legal problems of the poor are somehow unique, and that a separate set of
rights and duties exist or need to be developed which are applicable only, or
primarily, to poor people. But there is no such thing as "poverty law." Lawyers
who represent poor clients are not persuading, or even asking, judges to create
"new law" for poor people. Rather they are seeking the application of old law
to new clients. They are, for example, demanding that courts view welfare
departments as government administrative agencies, which they are, rather
than as dispensers of charity, which is how they have too often viewed them-
selves. When so viewed, the welfare department is limited in its actions by
the constitution and by applicable statutes and regulations. Thus, the agency
may not impose arbitrary or irrational eligibility requirements ;' it may not
1. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
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-absent the justification of a compelling state interest-deny benefits to an
applicant because he has exercised a constitutional right,2 require the relin-
quishing of a constitutional right as a condition to the receipt of benefits,3 nor
terminate a recipient's benefits without notice and hearing.4 Such limitations
have not been created by the courts as special rights for poor people. Rather,
they represent the extension to poor people of principles established in the
existing legal system. In other words, "welfare law" is really constitutional and
administrative law, and ought to be included in those regular law school
courses. 5 A similar analysis applies to public housing.6
Legal rights are not self-fulfilling. They must be asserted by and on be-
half of those who are entitled to them. Thus,. the statutory, contractual, and
common law rights of tenants in private housing, such as those rights created
by housing and health codes, civil rights laws,7 rent withholding and rent
control laws, lease provisions, express or implied covenants of quiet enjoyment,
habitability and repair, and those created by public policy, such as the defense
of retaliatory eviction,8 provide little, if any, relief to a tenant unless the
tenant, or an attorney representing the tenant, asserts those rights. The rights
are not new rights for the poor; they are available to all tenants, indigent and
affluent alike. However, the absence in the past of lawyers in any significant
number to represent poor tenants have prevented those tenants from realizing
and enjoying their rights. In the area of private housing, as in the welfare
area, "poverty law" is properly seen to be not a new law for the poor, but
rather the application of old law to new clients. And just as "welfare law"
is really constitutional and administrative law, so tenants' rights is a part of
property law and ought to be included in the regular law school property
courses.
The analysis we are suggesting for welfare and housing law applies also
to the chapters in Law and Poverty dealing with consumer credit and family
law. Existing law school courses in contracts, sales, bills and notes, secured
transactions, and creditors' rights ought to include consideration of the prob-
lems and rights of consumers and borrowers, whether they be poor or affluent.
Such "test cases" as Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation9 do not establish
new rights exclusive to poor persons; they enunciate and vindicate the rights
2. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
3. James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
4. Goldberg v. Kelly, 90 S. Ct. 1011 (1970).
5. Of course, the technicalities of welfare administration, and the particular statutory
and regulatory schemes which create and govern welfare programs, are appropriate con-
cerns for an advanced specialized administrative law seminar in welfare, in the same
sense as are other regulatory and benefit-dispensing agencies.
6. Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, Docket Nos. 33226-33229 (2d Cir.
Apr. 29, 1970).
7. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
8. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016(1969).
9. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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of all consumers and borrowers. Similarly, in the area of family law, the rights
of children and parents in juvenile delinquency, neglect, and child abuse
proceedings are not applicable only to the poor. A decision such as In re
Gault'0 declares and extends constitutional protections to all children accused
of juvenile delinquency, not just to the children of the poor, and ought to be
included in the regular constitutional law and family law courses in the law
school curriculum.
There is no need to belabor the point. What we are saying is simply this:
the bulk of the material presented in this book involves legal issues which are
not in principle peculiar to poor people and which ought to be included in
existing law school courses rather than in a separate "poverty law" course.
It is hoped that the text, whose editors include the Dean of the University
of Virginia Law School and a Professor since appointed the Dean of the
Columbia Law School, does not represent a conscious decision to leave un-
changed the basic character of the law school which is at present dominated
by a curriculum and ethos of advocacy for wealthy interests. Yet use of the
book not only could leave the traditional curriculum undisturbed, but the book
itself incorporates a set of assumptions implicit in the law of the affluent into
the "law for the poor." The usual casebook set of appellate decisions without
a description of their legal, institutional, real-life context is saturated with
assumptions-about values and the way things happen-which are most
powerful because they are implicit and unexamined, embedded in the material.
The casebook approach implies a vision of the respective positions of the
parties to a law suit and of the nature and capabilities of the judicial process.
It implies that the client faces the problem as an autonomous agent who is in
a position, both financial and social, to mount a challenge; that the act at the
root of the grievance is sufficiently visible to permit the challenge; that each
party has an opportunity to present his case before an impartial trier of fact
and law willing and able fully to hear and deliberate each case; that cases set
precedents which will be implemented to modify the system. For the purposes
of training lawyers for the affluent, this idealized model may well have heuristic
value. Even if it inculcates a set of beliefs which legitimate institutions and
life styles regardless of everyday experience, it is nevertheless desirable
perhaps to have servants who accept the mythology of the system.
Affluent litigants are relatively free men, involved in legal entanglements
more or less as equals. If the host of institutions designed to keep them out
of the cumbersome and unpredictable court system somehow fails, they com-
mand respect and get a neutral tribunal. They are at arm's length with their
adversaries; they have the power, position, and distance to challenge. If many
life decisions are made with due consideration to their tax aspects, no one is
thought of as being "on tax" the way many refer to the poor as being "on
10. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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welfare." And the affluent are not involved with welfare, public housing, public
hospitals, public food, school officials, police or the family court.
But the incorporation of these assumptions into "poverty law" distorts
understanding, for it is the failure to realize in practice these and related
assumptions which is one of the defining features of poverty.
The poor gain their identities from their relation to a set of public
institutions on which they are semi-permanently dependent. "On welfare,"
a term of definition, is more like a feudal, than an arm's length contractual
status. The legal problems peculiar to poverty involve the relationship of
poor people to other people and to institutions which possess great power
over their lives. The poor are not autonomous agents capable of asserting
rights. When a poor man does challenge authority, either as plaintiff or
defendant, he finds himself without the capacity to obtain justice. Poverty is
not just being poor, but in addition it is being at the bottom and being power-
less to demand respect or good treatment. As long as we portray rich men
and the higher courts as typical of poor men and the poor men's courts, we
are failing to face up to the essential facts of poverty.
This contradiction, between the traditional law school assumption and
the reality of social position and courts, is one piece of an ideological conflict
encountered when the law school begins dealing with social problems. Trade
schools are partisan. The law school has always been closely aligned with
established economic interests and has thus taught and promoted an ideology
compatible with those interests. A study of social problems, however, entails
a criticism of the established institutions and a questioning of the official
ideology. The politics, values, and explanations of reality in the law of the
affluent seem tenuous when viewed from the perspective of the poor. Thus,
political issues settled without argument or never encountered in the old
curriculum become live issues.
Take the problem of class. This book focuses on the problem of minorities,
particularly the Black minority. Blacks do contribute more than their share
to the impoverished population. But most poor people are white and a good
portion of these are of Western European origin. The United States has a
poverty-stricken minority in all geographic areas, including those where there
are few blacks or other visible minority groups. By its emphasis and concen-
tration, however, the book tends to give the suggestion of an equivalency
between poverty and racial or ethnic discrimination.
One of the five chapters in the book treats Employment Discrimination,
but no space is devoted even to stating, much less really examining the policies
and institutions that result in the United States' having by far the highest un-
employment rate of the highly industrialized nations. A great deal of the
unemployment in the United States within all racial and ethnic groups is not
a function of racial discrimination.
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The editors reprint in full Moynihan's "The Negro Family." Whatever
the relationship between family structure, male child development, and poverty,
one thing is certain: the effect is not confined to Negroes. The white lower-
class exhibits the same family instability and breakdown characteristics as the
Negro lower-class. This text, however, to the extent that it treats the issue,
examines it again as if it were a problem of minorities, particularly the Black.
The law is keyed to ameliorating racial or ethnic discrimination, not
economic class discrimination. Few distinctions based on racial or ethnic
criteria can stand up to legal challenge; but all sorts of distinctions based
on economic position are de rigueur, built into the system, unquestioned, not
perceived as discrimination. The equal protection clause may get poor people
access to the courts,11 but it is not very useful in obtaining subsistence, medical
care, housing, or education.0 2
Indeed it is a fair generalization to say that laws are written and the
legal process structured in such a way that existing class inequalities are main-
tained. This book, however, manages to evade the fact that we do have dis-
parate classes in our society. Much less does it analyze the problems of in-
suring justice under the law for the lower economic class. A text and course
in "law and poverty" should recognize the real issue, which is the unequal
distribution of income and resources. Who are the poor? How do they become
poor? Why do they remain poor? What role has the law played in creating,
reinforcing, and exacerbating economic inequalities? To what extent can
litigation and legislation effect an amelioration of the undesirable effects of
existing law?
We would like to suggest an alternative way to incorporate the issues of
"law and poverty" into the curriculum. These tentative notes are toward the
goal of remaking the law school curriculum so that each course examines
the social implications and underlying values of the material included in it,
assesses the different impact on the various classes, and provides a more
accurate picture of the real world. We believe that this can be done without
sacrificing, and perhaps in a manner better serving, the goal of training
people to become competent lawyers, familiar with legal materials, procedures,
and research techniques and with the processes of legal reasoning.
In the first place, many legal problems of the poor could fit quite easily
11. Jeffreys v. Jeifreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
12. Btut cf. Hazard, Law Reforming in the Anti-Poverty Effort, 37 U. Cm. L. R1v.
242, 246 (1970) :
[W]hereas the problem of poverty is essentially that of unequal income dis-
tribution, one of the least formally restricted guarantees in the Constitution is
the equal protection clause. Surely the advocate can be found who would be
willing to argue that equal protection is denied under a system of taxation and
wealth transfer that fails to result in substantial equality of income. Most
other :proposals to reform the law for the benefit of the poor would follow a
fortiori.
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into the regular law school courses. As we have stated, the welfare cases and
materials belong in the constitutional and administrative law courses; con-
sumer problems fit naturally into the commercial law courses; tenants' prob-
lems should be considered in the property courses; and so forth. This shuffling
of cases involving poor people into the standard curriculum is the first step.
In addition, materials and cases should emphasize the integrated nature of
social problems and permit comparison of the respective positions of the
classes. Courses should be designed to examine systems, such as income dis-
tribution, to permit a comprehensive view.
Each course should be revised, and some courses amalgamated, to high-
light the important policy areas, to discuss the economic or social interests
being served, to compare the legal framework to other similar systems, to
inspect institutional implementation. Thus, tax law would be integrated into
a larger course studying the legal framework of income distribution, con-
centrating on who gets what and how it's done. Federal taxation today is not
merely a levy; it is a very significant form of government regulation of the
economy, a guide to economic decisions, a system of subsidies. Materials and
cases challenging specific provisions of tax laws, discussing their social impact
and comparing them to schemes in other countries would be included.
This course might also examine the extent to which federal housing pro-
grams, such as those of the FHA and Veterans Administration, highway
programs, and tax incentives and deductions subsidize the middle classes and
help create the urban slums. The course should also examine the economic
aspects of Welfare, Unemployment Compensation, Social Security, and
various new schemes such as the Family Allowance and the Negative Income
Tax.
A text for a separate course dealing with the problems of the poor should
concentrate on the unique problem of the poor: i.e., that many people at the
bottom of the opportunity and income pyramid are deprived of honor and
self-respect. Such a text would examine the total employment picture, as well
as the public institutional network with which the poor are involved. The
employment sections would deal with unemployment, minimum wages, wage
differentials, child labor laws, employment discrimination, and the possible
methods by which full employment could be attained with complementary
legislation to maintain the equilibrium.
The components of the public institutional network would not be dealt
with individually, but from a perspective of their common features and the
manner in which they complement each other to form a system. Instead of
the traditional breakdown, this section would be organized functionally:
1. discretion in low-echelon agents;
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2. features of bureaucracy that guide exercise of the discretion;
3. the relationship between the low-echelon agent and the poor person;
4. class criteria in agency administration;
5. devices for redressing grievances; and
6. participation in degrading rituals.
These headings, obviously appropriate to welfare, are equally applicable
to the schools, public housing, police, mental hospitals, and the poor man's
courts (criminal, juvenile and family courts) that review the decisions of the
institutional personnel. The public service bureaucracies have common prop-
erties and ways of functioning. And, more important, they have been insulated
from responsiveness to and control by the poor ward-client in similar ways.
The roles of civil service rules, administrative procedures, and limited judicial
review by virtue of rules of exhaustion of remedies and broad discretion should
be examined.
A text on poverty must also address the problem of how to establish
institutions and devices through which the poor can make these agencies
responsive. This demands a recognition of the limitations of legal action and
a familiarity with the range of ways of controlling administrative discretion.
How can the decision-making processes in the agencies be made more
responsible to the needs of the client? How can the ambit of discretion be
narrowed, the criteria of discretion strengthened, the visibility of the decisions
enhanced? Can we devise institutional structures that will be disposed toward
feelings of cooperation, that will create pressures for closeness and responsibil-
ity, that will harmonize the interest of police officer, teacher, welfare worker
and poor person? Why do these structures as constituted today fail in their
objectives? How do conflicts arise? What are the opposing interests?
The conflicts between agency workers and the poor have given rise to
many cases. Instead of using these cases merely as illustrations of legal prin-
ciples, we can examine them by considering the parties and the basis of the
controversy, as well as the legal issues in dispute. An excellent example is the
California "midnight raid" case.'3 The raids involved in that case were appar-
ently commenced in order to gather statistics demonstrating that there was
little cheating and that the bureaucracy was doing its job.
A text on poverty law should also deal with the various schemes that
have been devised to modify poverty-related institutions, to give some power
to the poor, to provide devices to redress grievances. The law, and some his-
tory, of the Community Action Programs and "maximum feasible participa-
tion," the utility of administrative hearings and Police Review Boards, and the
13. Parrish v. Alameda Civil Service Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57
Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967). (The raids actually took place in the early morning-at 6:00 A.M.)
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possible benefits of decentralization, -local courts, para-professional aides, and
Ombudsmen should be included.
All organization is somewhat artificial, exaggerating some relationships,
obscuring others. In any selection, some goals will be maximized. The major
differences between the present system and this suggested curriculum are the
criteria and purposes. Organization and selection in today's texts reflect the
interests and perspectives of private wealth. A drastically changed curriculum
acknowledging the presence in the United States of all economic interests
would have as its goal the study of the legal framework and its impact on the
lives of people in all classes.
It should be noted that these suggestions are directed to content. Style
and method of teaching are other matters. Any curriculum can be utilized to
train lawyers. The legal mind and the skills of research can be developed
through close attention to collapsing buildings or collapsible corporations.
In a new curriculum, selected and organized according to new criteria
and purposes, the cases and materials in Law and Poverty would surely merit
inclusion. The book contains the fundamental cases. Even more important, it
does contain some insights into the relations between poverty and the entire
economic organization, some challenges to the assumptions underlying our
system of courts as grievance-redressing devices, and some recognition of
the oppressiveness of the administrative network. However, these ideas are
included in such a way that their significance is crippled if not destroyed. The
organization of the book, its major themes, and the book's relation to (or
insulation from) the rest of the curriculum suppress and vitiate them.
The character of the law school as presently dominated by the curriculum
and ideology of advocacy for wealthy interests will not be greatly influenced
by one course or a few minutes of various courses of law related to the poor,
even if some of the materials in the course do challenge the message of the
other materials. Setting up a course in poverty law, unrelated to the rest
of the curriculum but incorporating the same politics, is comparable to the
practice of some law firms in permitting their staff to contribute a small per-
centage of their efforts to work pro bono publico, while maintaining their
central focus on money-making and service to the affluent.
We believe that the contemporary law school must transcend its trade
school origin. It is not just a matter of academic morality. However difficult,
higher education should be objective, dispassionate and detached. It should
attempt to serve truth (or at least consider all reputable versions of it) rather
than the interests that support the school. In a time of great change, the large
class of public intellectuals trained in law schools should graduate with more
flexibility and knowledge than the presently constituted law school provides.
Law and Poverty, although reflecting an intelligent and concerned effort, does
19701 BOOKS 1313
HeinOnline -- 70 Colum. L. Rev.  1313 1970
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
not, in our opinion, meet these standards when appended to the traditional
curriculum and when measured against the need and the opportunity.
STEPHEN WIZNEE
Mobilization for Youth Legal Services, Inc.
New York City
WILLIAm RESNICK
Director, State of New Jersey Office of Juvenile Justice
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE.
Edited by Boris I. Bittker. Branford, Conn.: Federal Tax Press, Inc., 1970.
Pp. xii, 485. $15.00.
What should an attorney do if, in preparing an income tax refund claim,
he discovers errors on the taxpayer's prior tax return, some of which are un-
favorable to the taxpayer? What course should tax counsel retained in an
estate tax audit follow upon learning that the decedent's widow may have
executed a contract with the decedent whereby she agreed not to exercise her
power of appointment over the marital deduction trust established by his will?
What standards of conduct or other restraints are there to guide the attorney
in the preparation of the minutes for a closely held corporation with substantial
accumulated earnings? Must the attorney in the first illustration call unfavor-
able errors to the attention of the Internal Revenue Service? In the second
example, what disclosure to the Service might counsel make, and if the client
refuses to agree to counsel's making any disclosure at all, what should the
attorney then do?
In each of these situations, the tax adviser possesses information adverse
to his client's interests. His viscera may or may not tell him whether he ought
to make any disclosure to the Service. He may find it useful to know that attor-
neys and accountants who devote much of their practice to income tax matters
seem to have developed an unusually keen sense of the need to disclose even
adverse facts to the government and that this attitude is believed by some
thoughtful practitioners to cause a divided loyalty in the attorney's relationship
to his client. Indeed, forthright and candid disclosure is not particularly com-
patible with the attorney's traditional role as advocate in an adversary proceed-
ing; in such a role, the attorney has no difficulty in refusing to give any quarter
to his opponent because the Canons of Ethics exhort undivided loyalty to the
client and a no-holds-barred attitude toward the opposition. Many tax practi-
tioners believe that such traditional standards of conduct are quite inadequate
when applied to tax practice; after all, the argument goes, the government (rep-
resenting one's fellow citizens) is not wholly an "adversary" and, moreover, the
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